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support for vegetarianism as well as a critical
perspective on the positions taken by adherents of
traditional ethical theories. Feminist approaches to the
issue enable one to explore the relationship between
theory and practice in our moral lives; indeed, they
require one to address the question of connections
between theory and practice. Ultimately as with all
complex and sophisticated ethical theories, it has to be
said that the introduction of feminist theorizing into
the topic of vegetarianism does not lead to easy
answers or simple remedies. It is both intellectually
interesting and practically significant that just as one
can find utilitarian arguments both for and against
vegetarianism and rights-based arguments both for and
against vegetarianism, there are a range of possible
feminist positions on vegetarianism.
There are many reasons for addressing the topic of
vegetarianism from a feminist, or rather from feminist
perspectives. 3 For one thing, a remarkable proportion
of the increasing number of vegetarians are women.4
The emphasis in much feminist literature in ethics on
the connection between life experience and values
makes it worth examining the gender dimension of the
so-called "vegetarian option."5 Further, a significant
amount of recent writing on vegetarianism, in particular,
has been produced by feminists, and there have been
several very prominent and influential ecofeminist
treatments of the issue which make the case for the
necessity of the connection. 6 Popular literature on
animal rights and vegetarianism often seems to assume
that there is a simple and easy case to be made for allying
feminism with vegetarianism. Carol Adams puts it
succinctly and forcefully when she implies that the
"values and beliefs imbedded in the choice to eat
animals are antithetical to feminism."?
Recent articles, nevertheless, have touched on the
tensions within feminist circles about the issue of
endorsing vegan, or even vegetarian conferences and
events. s Ecofeminists, specifically, contend that "in
the case of meat eating, the personal is political"; yet,
not all feminists accept Ulis. 9 Some feminists have
even suggested that efforts to endorse vegetarianism
are tantamount to cultural imperialism, and have the
effect of undermining cultural traditions, in particular
those of women of color. lo Thus, some feminists are
likely to feel a reluctance to advocate vegetarianism
for several reasons: in order to avoid the accusation
of cultural imperialism, out of deference to cultural
traditions, and not wanting to be perceived as
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Nicholas Dixon has organized his paper, "A Utilitarian
Argument for Vegetarianism," around the positions for
and against vegetarianism that are derived from the two
main currents of traditional ethical theoriesutilitarianism and some variant of a rights-based
approach. These currents are reflected in the work of
Peter Singer and Tom Regan, respectively and are taken
up by many others who write in the area. It is easy to
understand why, in the context of his project of
providing a utilitarian argument for vegetarianism, he
chooses to limit the discussion to the two groups he
addresses-utilitarianism and "human supremacism."
Yet, it leaves out an entire area of recent deliberation
and debate concerning the moral imperative of
vegetarianism, that which is presented in contemporary
ecofeminist thought. This is an area which deserves
consideration, and not only for reasons of comprehensiveness, representation and inclusivity. It deserves
consideration, also, and perhaps more importantly,
because the issues addressed and points made by
feminist writers on the topic speak directly to the need
to combine "private decision with political action."2
I wish to focus instead on a third set of arguments
that can provide-on some variants-the basis for
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infringing on women's rights to choose. Some feminist
theorists reject the claims of animal rights theory on
other theoretical grounds.
It might be helpful at this point to distinguish two
disparate approaches to feminist ethics: one based on a
"care ethic" and one based on an "anti-domination
ethic."u The former is derived from, and developed
out of the work of psychologist Carol Gilligan, whose
book In A Different Voice is widely read and whose
ideas have become extremely influential. The latter can
be found in the work of feminist theorists such as Carol
Adams, Karen Warren, Lori Gruen and Kathryn Paxton
George, among others. Simply put, the care ethic
emphasizes the importance of relationships and
emotional connections between beings, and the antidomination ethic advocates the "elimination ofany and
all factors that contribute to the continued and
systematic domination or subordination of women."12
What I hope to show in this paper is that there is no
neat and tidy relation between a particular approach to
ethics and a stance on the moral imperative of
vegetarianism. Some people think that a care ethic will
support, or even require vegetarianism, others do not.
And similarly, some people think that an antidomination ethic will support, or even require
vegetarianism, but others do not. The importance of an
exploration of feminist perspectives on vegetarianism,
I argue, does not reside in whether or not the approach
will produce the "right answer." The importance lies
instead in the approach taken to moral reasoning.
I will first discuss the claims made by Nell Noddings
on behalf of a variant of care ethic and the positions
she takes on human obligations towards animals derived
from that ethic. She finds that the development of her
ethical perspective does not dovetail with the approach
taken by ecofeminists and others. Next, I will examine
the positions advocated by adherents of variants of an
anti-domination ethic. I will first address those theorists
who argue for an integral connection between feminism
and vegetarianism. I will then look at the analysis
presented by Kathryn Paxton George, who takes an antidomination approach but explicitly critiques the
arguments of traditional ethical theory in favour of the
"vegan ideal." It is clearly worth exploring why some
feminists think vegetarianism is morally obligatory and
others don't. It is also worth speculating on the
implications of their approaches to moral reasoning,
on their views about how moral thinking and feeling
should proceed.
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The care ethic is premised a "mode of thinking that is
contextual and narrative rather than formal and
abstract."13 Gilligan proposes that there is a different
moral voice, one which tends to be articulated by
women and tends to be empirically associated with
women. This different moral voice is concerned with
care and responsibility rather than with the focus of the
dominant moral voice-rights and justice. The
dominant moral voice, Gilligan claims, tends to be
articulated by men and tends to be empirically
associated with men. The ethic of care is thus contrasted
with the ethic of rights and justice. In passing, I would
like to point out that Gilligan sometimes writes as if
one could simply combine utilitarianism and a
deontological or rights-based approach to ethics in one
position. Other authors, such as Josephine Donovan,
who write about "animal rights theory" tend to use this
term to cover both utilitarian and rights-based
approaches. Needless to say, moral philosophers would
resist this lumping and fmd it unhelpful at best.
Nell Noddings' book Caring: A Feminine Approach
to Ethics and Moral Education contains a chapter titled
"Caring for Animals, Plants, Things and Ideas." In a
passage in that chapter, Noddings makes clear that her
"caring" ethic extends only to humans and that her
approach to ethics would not result in a judgmental
stance against raising animals for food, eating meat or
other human uses of animals (sealing, hunting, fishing
etc.). She says positive things about keeping pets, in
part because of the benefits to humans in so doing.
Similarly, spiders, toads and snakes are welcome in the
garden due to their usefulness. As for rats, she says she
would not torture a rat, and she would hesitate to use
poisons on one, but she "would shoot it cleanly if the
opportunity arose."14 Thus, her approach is really quite
anthropocentric, a fact which she does not Lry to deny.
Noddings, ultimately, does not accept the interpretation
of speciesism found in animal rights theory. She says
instead that "[i]t is not "speciesism" to respond
differently to different species if the very form of
response is species specific."15
It is necessary to set her remarks in context in order
to understand why she takes the position she does. For
Noddings, primary moral obligation is located in the
domain of human life. The ethical impulse or attitude,
she says, is grounded in the caring relation. Caring, in
tum, depends upon past experience and conscious
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choice. 16 Caring is anchored in recognition ofrelations.
Furthermore, our obligation to summon the caring
attitude is limited by the possibility of reciprocityP
Obligation, then, can only arise on encounter. IS As
responsiveness or perceived responsiveness increases
in the potential to be cared-for being, then so does caring.
What this means for animals is that affection for
animals varies greatly across persons. Some people will
have had past experiences---encounters with certain
animals and they will choose to undertake a commitment to that being. Such is the reason that Noddings
herself perceives an obligation to her family pet, a cat
who appears expectantly, stretches its neck, and
vocalizes its need. 19 In response, Noddings feels
obligated to that particular animal, and perhaps to others
of its kind she encounters. But the obligation does not
extend any further, and certainly not to animals in
general. For Noddings, one cannot be obligated to the
entire class of animals. 20
Of course, other people will not have had past
experiences or encounters with animals, nor will they
choose to undertake any commitments to animals. In
that case, they can hardly be said to have an obligation
to any particular beings, on Noddings' account. They
can be expected to avoid inflicting pain, since the one
thing that Noddings' approach does require is that we
must not inflict pain without justification. One must
act to "prevent pain to consciousness, even the
nonreflective consciousness of animals."21 According
to Noddings, when the form of response of the being in
question permits detection of pain, then we as caregivers
are obligated to relieve it. Noddings' version of a care
ethic, then, seems to provide a rationale for a minimal
obligation to refrain from inflicting pain upon animals,
although even that may be qualified. 22 It does not give
rise to further obligations to promote the welfare of
animals, except insofar as particular caregivers choose
to undertake a commitment to care for particular
animals. It would not lead to judgmental stances
prohibiting meat eating or the raising of animals for
food or other reasons.
I do not want to dwell on a discussion of the "care
ethic," since I think that most arguments for
vegetarianism that rest upon a feminist ethic depend
upon the anti-domination version of feminist ethics. In
addition, as I have already mentioned, at least one
proponent of the care ethic version of feminist ethicsnamely Nell Noddings-explicitly rejects the idea that
the care ethic entails support for vegetarianism.
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Donovan actually tries to combine elements of both the
care ethic and the anti-domination ethic approaches to
feminist ethics. I will now go on to discuss the antidomination versions of feminist ethics.
ill
In an article entitled "Animal Rights and Feminist
Theory," Josephine Donovan sets out the case for a
feminist or feminine ethic to address the issue of the
ethical treatment of animals. She claims that it is
necessary to ground an ethic of concern for animals
in what she calls "an emotional and spiritual
conversation with nonhuman life-forms." She finds
both utilitarianism and rights theories to be inadequate
for this purpose, primarily due to the insistence ofmale
moral philosophers that their positions are rooted in
reason and not emotion.
Donovan quotes Peter Singer's preface to Animal
Liberation in which he recounts an anecdote about a
visit to the home of a woman who claimed to love
animals but who ate meat. He writes: " ....certainly she
was keen to talk about animals. 'I do love animals', she
began... and she was off. She paused while refreshments were served, took a ham sandwich, and then
asked us what pets we had."23 Donovan says that
Singer's point "is not only to condemn the woman's
hypocrisy in claiming to love animals while she was
eating meat but also to dissociate himself from a
sentimentalist approach to animal welfare."24 Singer
then goes on to profess that he and his wife were not
particularly interested in, nor fond of animals, that they
did not 'love' animals. He says that the "portrayal of
those who protest against cruelty to animals as
sentimental, emotional 'animal lovers' [has meant]
excluding the entire issue... from serious political and
moral discussion."25 Donovan takes Singer to be
assuming that associating the cause of animal rights
"with 'womanish' sentiment is to trivialize it."26
Donovan goes on to propose that women animal
rights theorists-here she includes people like Mary
Midgley (author of Animals and Why They Matter) and
Constantia Salamone (an activist)-bave been able to
develop theories which acknowledge and emphasize the
importance of emotional bonding with animals.
Midgley, for example, talks about the social and
emotional complexity of animals and says: "[w]hat
makes our fellow beings entitled to basic consideration
is surely not intellectual capacity but emotional
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fellowship."27 Salamone and other activists adopt a
more explicitly feminist stance and condemn the
"rationalist, rnasculinist bias of current animal rights
theory," according to Donovan. 28
There are at least two ways in which emotion and
emotional fellowship between humans and nonhuman
animals could be relevant to the discussion of the ethical
treatment of animals. One way in which it could be
relevant is in providing reasons to treat animals with
kinship. Thus, the biological affrnity between humans
and other animals could be seen to be at least partial
justification for treating animals with equal concern and
respect. If this is the intended interpretation, then the
feminist position would simply echo the utilitarian
position fIrst formulated by Jeremy Bentham, who said
"[t]he question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they
talk? but, Can they suffer?"29
I would argue that this is not the import of feminist
approaches presented by Donovan and others.
Recognition of sentience or the capacity for suffering
or enjoyment does not distinguish feminist approaches
from utilitarian approaches. The issue that arises from
the application of feminism to the question of the ethical
treatment of animals is the role of emotion in the process
of ethical reasoning. I take Donovan's critical point to
be that a feminist ethic for the treatment of animals is
one that emerges out of "women's relational culture of
caring and attentive love."3o She implies, then, that
moral reasoning should attend to this culture and should
incorporate a sensitivity to the affective dimension of
our (meaning us humans) relations with animals as well
as with each other. 31
Carol Adams uses the phrase "traffIc in animals" as
a parallel to the term "traffIc in women" to suggest the
parallels. Lori Gruen emphasizes the social construction
of the connection between women and animals, a
connection created by patriarchy as a means of
oppression. She says that "ecofeminists are committed
to a reexamination and rejection of all forms of
domination.'032 She refers to the work of Karen Warren
during the elaboration of her anti-domination ethical
perspective. Karen Warren, in "The Power and Promise
ofEcological Feminism," presents a critique of the role
of conceptual frameworks in the logic of domination, a
logic which has justified both the domination of nature
and women by men.
Warren argues that there are several significant
features ofoppressive conceptual frameworks including
value dualisms and logic of domination. 33 Value
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dualisms are disjunctive pairs which are seen as
oppositional and exclusive and which place higher
status, prestige and value on one disjunct rather than
another. Examples include: mindlbody, reason/emotion,
male/female. A logic of domination is a structure of
argumentation which leads to a justification of
subordination. The justification rests on the grounds of
characteristics-for example, rationality-which
allegedly the dominant (e.g., men) have and the
subordinate (e.g., women and nonhuman animals)
supposedly lack. 34
Warren argues that ecofeminisrn "involves an ethical
shift from granting moral consideration to nonhumans
exclusively on the grounds of some similarity they share
with humans (e.g., rationality, interests, moral agency,
sentiency, right-holder statuS).',35 Warren implies that
the shift is toward an approach which provides a
contextual account, one which has several significant
features: it "makes a central place for values of care,
love, friendship, trust and appropriate reciprocity" and
it "involves a reconception of what it means to be
human, and in what human ethical behavior consists."36
As with Donovan, it seems as if elements from the care
ethic and the anti-domination ethic are being merged
and combined.
IV

There is yet another feminist perspective on vegetarianism and in particular, on the vegan ideal, which needs
to be brought into the discussion, and that perspective
can be found in the work of Kathryn Paxton George.
George has taken a critical stance on the assumption
that there is a simple connection between a feminist
approach rooted in concern for social justice and the
universalist prescription in favor of ethical veganism
based on traditional moral theory. George has asked
the question "Should feminists be vegetarians?" and
her answer seems to be "Not necessarily." She argues
that the vegan ideal is actually discriminatory because
the arguments for it "presuppose a 'male physiological
norm' that gives a privileged position to adult, middleclass males living in industrialized countries."37
George's concern is that people who are not adult,
middle-class males living in industrialized countries
cannot be expected to adopt vegetarian and vegan diets
for a whole series of reasons-having to do with
ecology, economy and nutrition. These people would
thus have to be excused from the duty to attain the virtue
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ethnocentrism. It seems that George's work, if nothing
else, has raised the concern that animal rights theory
might have to address a similar critique.

associated with ethical lifestyles. As George puts it: "[i]f
women, and infants, and children, and the elderly, and
those who live almost everywhere else besides western
societies are routinely excused for doing what would
normally be considered wrong, in practice this relegates
them to a nwral underclass of beings who, because of
their natures or cultures, are not capable of being fully
moral. "38 This leads her to suggest that the moral tradition
which has this implication is one which is designed to
serve only the most privileged class of humans.
The point that vegetarianism can be more easily
realized by persons in industrialized countries has been
made elsewhere. As Beardsworth and Keil put it: "[t]he
conditions in which contemporary voluntary vegetarianism can flourish are located not only in a cultural
climate of nutritional pluralism. They also rest on the
economic foundations of an affiuent, consumer-oriented
economy which can draw upon a vast array of food
items, freed by the channels of international trade from
the narrow limits of locality, climate and season."39
George adds to this point a concern with the gender
dimensions of the vegan ideal.
The claim that George makes, based on these points,
is that the traditional arguments for animal rights and
animal welfare or liberation are tainted by bias. I do
not want to enter into the debate concerning the accuracy
of the nutritional literature on which George bases her
critique-some of that debate can be found in Gary
Varner's article "In Defence of the Vegan Ideal."4o
Suffice it to say that George thinks her analysis is well
grounded in contemporary scientific studies and
analysis, but her critics disagree.
I do want to suggest that George's critique has
interesting implications for a utilitarian defense of
vegetarianism. The critique would have some relevance
for a reassessment of rights-based theories, but it is less
clear what the implications would be. Certainly,
consequentialist utilitarianism bas to take seriously the
potential consequences of advocacy of universal
vegetarianism and veganism. If there is sufficient
substance to the claim that the vegan ideal is
discriminatory due to the ecological, economic and
nutritional factors outlined by George, then that has to
be taken into account. Utilitarians need to consider the
potential effects of their prescriptions on everyone
concerned. It does seem somewhat arbitrary to limit
the evaluation to only Western, industrialized societies.
There has been an ongoing critique of environmental
ethics generally, for its shortsightedness and

Between the Species

v
Karen Warren's and Lori Gruen's ecofeminist
perspectives on ethics would seem to lead to a position
on the treatment of animals that converges with Carol
Adam's position derived from feminist critical theory
and feminist theology. They would all recommend
vegetarianism as a feminist statement against patriarchal
dominance. Josephine Donovan details the kinds of
actions and policies concerning the treatment ofanimals
that she thinks are entailed by the feminist rejection of
either/or thinking, or epistemological dualism. She says
feminists should reject the following: earnivorism, the
killing of animals for clothing, hunting, the trapping of
wildlife for fur, factory fanning, use of lab animals for
testing of beauty and cleaning products, rodeos, and
circuses. Feminists must work to abolish the "animalindustrial complex," in other words. 41 Additionally,
feminists must support efforts to replace medical
experiments by computer models and tissue culture and
support the drastic redesigning of zoos. As she puts it;
"[a]lI of these changes must be part of a feminist
reconstruction of the world."42
From the perspective of moral philosophy and the
question of the choice of ethical theory, it is significant
that the list of recommended actions and policies
provided by Peter Singer or Tom Regan or other
adherents of either utilitarian or rights-based theories
would not differ significantly from that presented by
Donovan. Thus, for many proponents of the antidomination ethic the prescriptive import of a feminist
approach resembles that of traditional ethical theories,
bllt the crucial difference lies in how one argues for
those recommended actions or policies.
Notes
I This paper was initially titled "Feminist Arguments for
and against Vegetarianism: Response to Nicholas Dixon's 'A
Utilitarian Argument for Vegetarianism'." It was prepared for
the Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals sessions held
in Chicago, Illinois, on April 27, 1995. I have revised and
expanded that original paper.

2 Nicholas Dixon, in his conclusion, acknowledges that
Frey's admonitions to combine private decision with political
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7 Carol J. Adams, "The Feminist Traffic in Animals," at
196. In Gaard, ed., Ecofeminism, Animals, Nature.

action are well taken. In a sense, I see my paper as beginning
where his left off. I wanted to explore the implications of
feminism for the specific issue and also for moral reasoning
in general. I do wish to state, nonetheless, that his paper
provides an exemplary illustration of the merits of traditional
ethical theorizing. When it is very well done, as his paper
certainly is, it is certainly still worth doing.

8 Both Lori Gruen and Carol J. Adams discuss their
frustrations when ''proposals to make feminist events crueltyfree have been rejected. Both mention an incident involving
the June 1990 convention of the National Women's Studies
Association, in which "the Coordinating Council rejected the
Ecofeminist Task Force recommendation that it "make a
strong statement of feminist non-violence, and make NWSA
a model of environmental and human behavior by adopting a
policy that no animal products ... be served at the 1991
conference, or at any further conferences." Lori Gruen,
"Dismantling Oppression: An Analysis of the Connection
Between Women and Animals," at 89-90. Carol J. Adams sets
out to provide a philosophical exploration of the claim that
"animal rights should be practically enacted through allvegetarian conferences." Carol J. Adams, "The Feminist
Traffic in Animals," at 196. Both papers are found in
Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature, edited by Greta
Gaard, Temple University Press, 1993.

3 It has become increasingly clear that it is not really
possible to speak of .ll feminist perspective, or the feminist
approach. There are myriad potential variants, or versions, of
feminism. Some of these can be grouped in broad clusters,
such as "cultural" feminism or "socialist" feminism or
"liberal" feminism, but these labels have limited usefulness.
Even within these broad clusters, there is as much diversity
as there is between and among them.
4 A Gallup Poll in Britain in 1995 found that the percentage
of Britons who are self-defined vegetarians had doubled
since 1984 to 4.5 per cent and that "[w]omen were almost
twice as likely as men to be vegetarian." The Ecorwmist,
August 19, 1995,20. Beardsworth and Keil report that in the
1990 Gallup study, "the combined group of vegetarians plus
red meat avoiders was 10.0 per cent, compared with ... 4.0
per cent in 1984" (at 255-256). In that same study, 12.8 per
cent of female respondents "claimed to eat meat rarely or not
at all," whereas the figure for men was 7.1 per cent. Thus, the
gender difference has been continuous. See "The Vegetarian
Option: Varieties, Conversions, Motives and Careers," byAlan
Beardsworth and Teresa Keil, The Sociological Review, 1992,
253-293 at 256. Age plays an important role, since young
women are the most likely of all to be vegetarian. One in
eight young women in Britain "professes vegetarianism." The
Economist, August 19, 1995,20.

9 Carol

10 Lori Gruen discusses this accusation and responses to
it in "Dismantling Oppression: An Analysis of the Connection
Between Women and Animals," supra, at 82.

11 I mention these two, not because I wish to imply that
they are the only ones possible, nor that they are even the
most significant, but only that they are the approaches that
one commonly finds in the literature on vegetarianism. There
are, of course, many, many different versions of feminist
ethics, including the increasing prominence of lesbian ethics.
Thus far, most of the treatments of vegetarianism that I have
come across have tended to affiliate with either an antidomination ethic or a care ethic approach.

5 This is the title of an article by Alan Beardsworth and
Teresa Keil, supra. It does give the impression that
vegetarianism is, in effect, a lifestyle choice. What I want to
suggest in this paper is that for many ecofeminists, it is much
more than a question of lifestyle choice.
6 Some recent examples include the following: Carol J.
Adams, The Sexual Politics ofMeat: A Feminist-Vegetarian
Critical Theory, Continuum, 1990. Carol J. Adams and
Josephine Donovan, editors, Women and Animals: Feminist
Theoretical Explorations, Duke University Press, 1995. Greta
Gaard, editor, Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature, Temple
University Press, 1993 (the papers by Lori Gruen and Carol
J. Adams specifically). See also Carol J. Adams and MlIIjorie
Procter-Smith, "Taking Life or ''Taking on Life"?," in Carol
J. Adams, editor, Ecofeminism and the Sacred, Continuum,
1993. Michael Allen Fox has written about the influence of
feminist thought on his defense of vegetarianism and critique
of environmental ethics. See his "Environmental Ethics and
the Ideology of Meat Eating," Between the Species: A Journal
ofEthics, Volume 9, 1993.
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16 Nell Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to
Ethics andMoral Education, at 157. University of California
Press, 1984.

17 Noddings,
18

supra, at 149.

Noddings, supra, at 152.

19 Noddings,

supra, at 157.

20 Noddings, supra, at 157. On page 154, she explains
that part of her criticism of utilitarianism results from its
treating animals as a vast group of interchangeable entities,
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of sources of pleasure and pain. The individuals are not the
focus, but rather the amounts of pleasure and pain. She is
discussing the debates about the "replaceability argument."

32 Lori Gruen, "Dismantling Oppression: An Analysis of
the Connection Between Women and Animals," at 80.

33 Karen J. Warren, "The Power and Promise of Ecological
Feminism," at 435. In Armstrong and Botzler. editors,
Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence.
McGraw-Hill, 1993.

21 Noddings, supra. at 154.
22 One might see echoes of utilitarianism in her discussion
of pain, which borders on setting out something like a
universalizing generalization. which she labors greatly to
avoid elsewhere. She claims that her ethic of caring "strives
consistently to capture our human intuitions and feelings,"
and that makes it preferable to utilitarian views of the sort
provided by Singer. Needless to say. her claims about
capturing intuitions would be disputed by many who may
have different intuitions on these issues. utilitarians and
ecofeminists and others. In other passages, she even suggests
some kind of balancing or trading off when she talks about
the need to seriously consider the impact on humans of
abolishing farming and hunting and so on and implies that
human needs could quite easily outweigh the interests of
animals. such as they are. This too resembles some aspects of
a utilitarian approach. particularly one that rests upon a
presumption of human supremacism.

34Warren, supra, at 436.
35 Warren, supra, at 442.
36Warren, supra, at 443.
37 Kathryn Paxton George, "Discrimination and Bias in
the Vegan Ideal," at 19. Journal of Agricultural and
Environmental Ethics. Volume 7(1). 1994.
38 George, supra, at 23.
39 Beardsworth and Keil, supra, at 289-290.
40 Gary E. Varner. "In Defence of the Vegan Ideal: Rhetoric
and Bias in the Nutrition Literature." Journal ofAgricultural
and Environmental Ethics, Volume 7(1), 1994. See also
Johanna Dwyer and Franklin M. Loew. "Nutritional Risks of
Vegan Diets to Women and Children: Are They Preventable?"
in the same issue.

23 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation. at ii. Second Edition.
New York Review of Booksl Random House, 1990.
24 Josephine Donovan. "Animal Rights and Feminist
Theory." Signs: A Journal ofWomen in Culture and Society.
Volume 15 (2),1990,350-375 at 350. Also reprinted in Adams
and Donovan, eds., Women andAnimals.
25

41 Barbara Noske uses this term in Humans and Other
Animals, Pluto Press, 1989, at 24.
42 Donovan, supra, at 375.

Singer, supra, at ii.

26 Donovan,

supra, at 351.

27 Quoted in Donovan, supra. at 351. See Mary Midgley,
Animals and "Why They Matter: A Journey Around the Species
Barrier. Penguin Books, 1983.
28

Donovan, supra. at 352.

29 Quoted in Donovan, at 356. From Jeremy Bentham,
Introduction to the Principles ofMorals and I.egislarion, 1789.
30 Donovan, supra, at 374.
31 Of course, as I have already elaborated on in the
discussion on Noddings above, simply taking an approach
based on "caring" does not mean that one will automatically
be driven to argue for vegetarianism. It is an interesting
question, then, how to account for the differences between
approaches which are based on care at some level. It is beyond
the scope of this paper, however, to address the larger
questions of choice of moral theory, levels of moral thinking,
processes of moral reasoning and the complex dynamics of
moral psychology and epistemology.
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